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Comments
PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE ASSOCIATE IN A
LAW FIRM: A FRENCH CASE STUDY
Tang Thi Thanh Trai Le *
In June 1977, as a result of a case brought before the Tribunal de
la Seine,' a "mini-revolution" 2 erupted in French legal circles. A
young woman associate of a law firm was discharged at mid-month
and paid half (F. 1250) her monthly salary. Mme X considered her
dismissal improper and filed a complaint with the Bdtonnier (President) of the Paris Bar. 3 After a hearing, the Conseil de l'Ordre (Executive Committee of the Bar) advised the firm to pay Mme X an
additional F. 1250 in settlement. Not satisfied, Mine X took her case
to the Tribunal de la Seine requesting compensatory damages of F.
2750 (F. 2500 for one month's notice and F. 250 for vacation time not
taken) and punitive damages of F. 10,000.
Why did Mme X's case stir such great interest in the French legal community? For the first time in French history, an avocat
(practicing attorney) asked a court to apply labor law4 in the resolution of an employment dispute with another avocat. By doing so,
Mme X represented herself as being an employee despite her status
as an avocat. Thus, Mine X rekindled a perennial debate of the
* Member, Board of Editors. This Comment is the partial result of a study on
Comparative Legal Ethics funded by the Dana Foundation.
1. Mine X.... c. Association d'Avocats Y.. . . et autres, Tribunal d'instance de
Paris, 8 April 1977, J.C.P., II, 19676; Recueil Dalloz Sirey at 589. The parties are designated X or Y when readily identifiable in the community. See text accompanying n.
85 infra for a discussion of the decision of the Tribunal.
2. The term was used by Le Monde, 26 April 1977 at 16; also Le Monde, 3 September 1977 at 1. Civil proceedings are rarely covered in the French press. One commentator observed that Mine X's case so aroused the interest of the legal community
as to warrant the attention of the daily press. Denis, Note, Tribunal d'instance de
Paris, 8 April 1977, Dalloz 1977 at 591.
3. Under art. 33 of the Internal Rules of the Paris Bar, all claims brought by an
avocat against another avocat must first be heard by the Bdtonnier. The Bdtonnier
can recommend a settlement or refer the matter to the Conseil de l'Ordre. (The term
Bdtonnier was first used in 1602. It comes from the bdton carried by the head of the
Bar, symbolizing his authority.)
4. French labor law is an autonomous body of law originally providing special
protection for industrial workers. It was later extended to cover white-collar employees. The autonomy of French labor law has been strengthened by the establishment
of separate tribunals which follow special procedures.
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French legal profession: Can an avocat be characterized as an employee?
At the core of this debate is the principle that the profession of
avocat is "liberal"5 and "independent." This concept has been recognized over the centuries 6 and was codified into law in 1971. 7 The

Internal Rules of the Paris Bar make the principle of independence

a matter of professional ethics.8 Thus, the characterization of an
avocat, even an avocat who is also a collaborateur (associate), as
merely an employee threatens the mandated independence of the
profession. Any infringement upon the independence of the avocat
would be a violation of ethical rules.9
Before discussing the threat to professional independence by
the characterization of a collaborateur as an employee however, a
few remarks on the organization of the legal profession in France
are in order.
THE FRENCH LEGAL PROFESSION

The various functions normally performed individually by
American attorneys are performed by a variety of French legal professionals. Prior to the 1971 reorganization of the legal professions,
the practitioners included the avocat, the avouL, the agr, the
notaire and the conseil juridique.1°
During the Gaullist period, an attempt was made to integrate
the French legal professions into a single "great profession."" The
treaty establishing the Common Market contained provisions dealing with free movement of services and freedom of establishment
among Common Market countries.' 2 These provisions provided the
5. For an explanation of the term "liberal," see text accompanying n. 46 infra.
6. The first oath of the avocat asserting the principle of independence is contained in an ordinance issued by Philippe le Hardi in 1274. The present oath is essentially identical: "I swear as an avocat, to exercise the defense and counsel with
dignity, conscience, independence and compassion, with respect to tribunals, public
authorities, and the rules of my Order, and not to say or publish anything which is
contrary to the law, regulations, good morals, security of the state and public peace."
Decree No. 72-468, 9 June 1972 (JournalOfficiel, 11 June 1972 and J.O. 6 July 1972) art.
23.
7. Law No. 71-1130, 31 December 1971 (J.O. 5 January 1972) art. 7.
8. Reglement Intdrieurdu Barreau de Paris,Preface and art. 18.
9. Id., Preface.
10. The avocat is a member of the self-governing bar and is responsible to the
Conseil de l'Ordre. The avocat is required to remain independent of his client and,
somewhat like the English barrister, specializes in oral advocacy. The avou, is an
officier ministeriel (ministerial official) appointed by the state. The avou is considered the client's agent and is restricted to written advocacy. The agr6 performs
functions similar to those of the avocat and avoue before the commercial courts. The
notaire is responsible for drafting instruments concerning landed estates, inheritances, corporations and the status of persons. Conseilsjuridiques, free of regulation
until the reform of 1971, give advice in the commercial and financial areas.
11. See Herzog & Herzog, "The Reform of the Legal Professions and of Legal Aid
in France," 22 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 462 (1973).
12. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Common Market),
298 U.N.TS. 140, Arts. 52-66.
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incentive for bringing the French legal profession into line with the
legal professions of the other Common Market countries. The Government and the Association Nationale des Avocats favored this reform. 1 3 Other groups of legal professionals however thought the
proposed reform too brutal 14 and an unnecessary "upheaval of insti15
tutions.'
Ultimately a compromise was effected. Law No. 71-1130 promulgated on 31 December 1971, modestly entitled "Reform of Some Legal Professions," merged the professions of avocat, avouL16 and
agree. Further, the law simply regulates the profession of conseil
juridique
to facilitate its eventual merger with that of avocat in the
7
future.'
Thus, despite the reform, the French avocat has a more restricted practice than his American counterpart. Similarly, the status of the French collaborateur differs from that of the American
associate.
The term "collaborateur" designates an avocat working for
another avocat. Since the particular process by which a law student
makes the transition to avocat is highly formalized when contrasted
with the process by which an American law student moves from law
school into practice, some explanation is required.
To become registered with a local bar as an avocat, a candidate
must first be a French citizen and have the degree of a Licence on
droit (after four years of study) or a Doctorat en droit (after qualifying for a Licence, taking advanced courses, and preparing a dissertation in a specific field). Second, the candidate must pass a
professional examination, the "Certification of Aptitude for the Legal Profession" (C.A.P.A.). Finally, the candidate must take an oath
and register with the bar. The candidate is then an "avocat
stagiaire" (lawyer in training) and his name is placed on the "liste
du stage" (list of avocats in training).18
The period of training, 19 normally three years, is conducted in
conjunction with the Centers of Professional Training, partially
funded by the State and located at the seat of each regional cour
d'appel (intermediate appellate court).29 Instruction is given by law
professors, judges, prosecutors and members of the bar. The avocat
stagiaire attends programs organized by the Centers and acquires
13. Herzog, supra n. 11 at 462.
14. See report of Zimmerman, J.O., Assembl~e Nationale, 13 October 1971 at 458.
15. Lobin, "R~flexions sur certains aspects de la r~forme des professions
judiciaires," Dalloz, 1972, Chronique, at 36.
16. The avoues practicing before the cours d'appel (intermediate appellate
courts) were unaffected by the reform.
17. The legal training, good morals, professional practice and registration required of avocats are now also imposed upon the conseil juridique. See Law No. 711130, supra n. 7, art. 54-56.
18. Id., art. 11; Decree No. 72-468, supra n. 6, art. 23-24.
19. Candidates with legal experience such as magistrates, law professors and
former avoues are exempt from this period of training. See id., art. 46.
20. Law No. 71-1130, supra n. 7, art. 12-14; Decree No. 72-468, supra n. 6, art. 26-42.
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practical skills through working with various legal practitioners such
as avou~s, conseils juridiques, experts comptables (certified public
accountants) or avocats.2 1 Positions in the office of an avocat are
the most sought after since exposure to a law firm is considered the
best means of acquiring practical knowledge of the legal profession.
During this training period, the young avocat must use the title of
"avocat stagiaire" and not simply that of avocat.22 The avocat
stagiaire may cultivate his own clientele and represent them in
court.23 The status of collaborateur-avocatstagiaire is a temporary
one, ending with completion of the training period. Upon the Conseil de l'Ordre's finding that he has performed his duty satisfactorily, the avocat stagiaire is accepted as an avocat titulaire (fullfledged lawyer) entitled to all the rights of a regular member of the
bar, including the right to elect the Conseil de l'Ordre.24
An avocat titulaire is faced with a number of alternatives. He
may (1) establish a solo practice; (2) practice en groupe in either an
association (loose partnership) or in a sociMtM civile professionnelle
(professional corporation); or (3) work with one or more other avo25
cats as a collaborateur.
The first alternative requires no explanation. The avocat choosing to practice en groupe shares mutual
responsibility with his colleagues. Each member is equal in stature.26 However, the avocat who chooses the third alternative of
working as a collaborateur does not share in the liability and responsibility of the avocat with whom he is associated. Other aspects of his status are somewhat unclear. For example, the same
definition is given for the temporary collaboration of the avocat
stagiaire and the more permanent collaboration of the avocat titulaire. The Internal Rules of the Paris Bar provide that "collaboration" for both requires the lawyer "to undertake to devote, without
any bond of subordination and to the exclusion of any occasional or
temporary help, all or part of his activities to the practice of another
21. An avocat stagiaire,although in training, can be a partner (associ,) of a firm.
This can occur, for example, if the avocat stagiaire can bring a substantial clientele
to the firm.
22. Decree No. 72-468, supra n. 6, art. 82. R~glement Int~rieur du Barreau de
Paris, art. 1(5). Understandably, young avocats are not happy with this restriction
and have worked for its suppression. See Lemaire, Les R6gles de la Profession
d'Avocat et les Usages du Barreau de Paris 177 (1975).
23. Decree No. 72-488, supra n. 6, art. 38.
24. Id., arts. 1,3,5.
25. Law No. 71-1130, supra n. 7, art. 8.
26. Until 1954, legal practice en groupe was not authorized in France. It was believed that any association among avocats would infringe upon both the independence of the avocat and the client's need for confidentiality. A decree of 1954 (No. 54406, 10 April 1954) first authorized grouping among avocats, but only under a form
(association) not cognizable as a legal entity. The association cannot be registered
with the bar as such. It simply creates obligations between avocats in association,
such as the duty not to represent a client whose interest contradicts that of another
member's client and not to accept a case objectionable to another member of the association. The more cohesive form of group practice, the Societe civile professionnele, applicable to all "liberal" professions, is comparable to the professional
corporation in America.
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lawyer. '27 The ambiguity of the collaborateur's status' is compounded by the ambiguity of the law governing collaboration between lawyers.
THE AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT OF COLLABORATION

Until 1977,28 no satisfactory characterization had been given to
the legal relationship between an avocat or firm and the collaborateur. The principal question was whether the employer-employee relationship could exist between lawyers. Law No. 71-1130 of
31 December 1971,29 creating and organizing the new profession of

avocat, purposely left the question unanswered. The law stated
only that the legal profession is a "liberal" and "independent" one
and that all activities which impair the independence of the lawyer
or the "liberal" character of the profession are "incompatible with
the practice of this profession. ' 30 The law does not address the
question whether wage-earning by a collaborateur is incompatible
with the legal profession. The law simply requires that a written
contract be"executed "to assure the collaborateursan equitable remuneration and guarantee their independence. '3 1 Significantly, the
contract is not characterized in any way. The law is silent in this regard largely because of the considerable debate that took place in
the Assembl~e Nationale and the Senat during consideration of the
matter. Originally, the government projet de loi (bill) provided that
"the lawyer may practice his profession as a sole practitioner, in a
partnership, as a member of a professional corporation, or an associate, employee or not, of another lawyer or law firm '

32

[emphasis ad-

ded]. The Commission des Lois (Law Commission) of the
Assemblke Nationale deleted the words "employee or not." During
discussion of the bill however, the government attempted to reinsert
the words by amendment, arguing that:
[T] here is nothing incompatible between working for wages
and the practice of a "liberal" profession. This can be seen
in other professions. Wage-earning honestly and openly accepted is without doubt preferable to the more or less clandestine kickback of honoraria. This is even more so when
the recipients are deprived
of the social advantages which
33

accompany wage-earning.
Those opposing the amendment considered this argument specious.
One deputy, to the hearty applause of his colleagues, declared:
[T]he independence or dependence of the lawyer is at

27. R~glement Int~rieurdu Barreau de Paris,Art. 65.
28. The new characterization is given by Law No. 77-685, 30 June 1977 (J.O. 1 July
1977). See text accompanying n. 100 infra.
29. See n. 11-17 supra.
30. Law No. 71-1130, supra n. 7, art. 7.
31. Id., Art. 8.
32. See Blanc, La Nouvelle Profession d'Avocat 58 (1972). Giverdon, "Rflexions
sur un avant projet," Dalloz, doctrine at 136.
33. J.O., Assemble Nationale, 8 December 1971 at 6531.
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stake .... Take a look at any treatise on labor law and you
will discover that the bond of the employee, arising as it
does from a contract for the hiring of services, necessarily
entails for the employee an obligation to obey the will of his
employer, his patron ... Contrary to what some people
may think, the lawyer has for his god only the law and for
his master only his conscience! The youngest avocat
stagiaire and the oldest bdtonnier are equal under the
Robe, and it would be unacceptable that one would call the
other his patron.34
In the Senat, the government again tried to introduce the concept of salariat (employment) into the projet de loi. The Minister of
Justice emphasized the social and economic benefits such a classification would bestow upon the young lawyer. In urging the legislators to do away with the fiction of collaboration whereby a
collaborateuronly pretends not to take wages, the Minister of Justice concluded the "legislator[s] could do better ... to look to what
really happens. ''35 Nevertheless, a majority of the Senat remained
unconvinced. As one Senator noted:
The matter of accepting wages is certainly not, in itself,
something which degrades the dignity of the one who receives them. But when one accepts a salary one is incontestably placed under the authority of the patron. It is thus
not possible for a lawyer, if he is an employee, to remain entirely independent and
to decline to argue a case as re36
quired by his patron.
Ultimately, the words "employee or not" were deleted. Instead,
a new paragraph requiring a written contract of collaboration was
added to assure the benefits of fair remuneration as well as to safeguard the avocat's independence. 37 The Minister of Justice, noted
that the Government yielded to this compromise because the Ministries of Justice, Economy and Finance had "practically reached [an]
accord to define [the] status of the collaborateur [as one] which
will give him the same benefits as those given by salariat.' '38 The
Minister thereby implied the creation of a new type of contract, distinct from the contract of employment and applicable only to collaboration between lawyers.
Nevertheless, the decree of 9 June 1972 implementing the law of
31 December 1971 did not clarify the nature of the contract of collaboration. The new decree only accentuated the ambiguity of the nature of the contract. The decree prescribed the format of the
contract of collaboration,requiring that it be written, 39 but left the
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
J.O. Senat, 17 November 1971 at 2021.
Id.
Law No. 71-1130, supra n. 7, art. 8.
J.O. Senat, December 1971 at 3108.
Decree No. 72-468, supra n. 6, art. 74.
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terms to be determined by the parties within the framework of the
bar's internal regulations.4
The ambiguity is further accentuated by seemingly contradictory provisions. For example, although under the law a collaborateur is the master of his own argument, he must inform "the
lawyer to whom he is bound" of the manner in which he plans to
handle each case.4 1 A collaborateurcan ask to be relieved of an as4
signment which he considers contrary to his conscience or beliefs, 2
but the lawyer for whom the collaborateurworks remains responsible for the collaborateur'sprofessional activities. 43 These seemingly
contradictory provisions justify a commentator's conclusion that
"the authors of the reform deliberately abstained from any attempt
to characterize the contract of collaboration."44
TRADITIONAL V. FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO COLLABORATION

In order to understand why salaried employment of collaborateurs has met with such staunch opposition by segments of
the French legal community, despite convincing pragmatic arguments to the contrary, one must understand the traditional approach to the profession of avocat. In contrast to the functional
approach, the traditional approach refuses to let pragmatic considerations interfere with the traditional model of the avocat as a free,
independent professional.
The TraditionalApproach
The characterization of the profession of avocat as "liberal" and
"independent" is at the heart of the matter. Unfortunately, the law
45

uses the terms "liberal" and "independent" without defining them.

Professor Jean Savatier, in his definitive work on "liberal professions," says that any discussion of the subject must focus on the relation between the professional and his client. To Savatier, this
relationship involves three aspects: (1) the nature of the professional's activity; (2) the type of interests entrusted to him and
(3) the social mission he assumes.4
First Savatier distills the qualities of the professional's activity:
it is intellectual, independent and disinterested. However each of
these characteristics standing alone is misleading. For example, "intellectual" is not totally appropriate since non-"liberal" professionals such as magistrates and bankers engage in highly intellectual
40. Id., art. 75. The internal rules of the Paris Bar, elaborating art. 75, require that
the contract of collaborationcontain an express provision excluding any bond of subordination. R4glement Int~rieur du Barreaude Paris,art. 65.
41. Decree No. 72-468, supra n. 6, art. 76.
42. Id.
43. Id., art. 77.
44. Denis, Note, supra n. 2.
45. See n. 30 supra.
46. Savatier, &Ptude
Juridiquede la ProfessionLiberale 35 (1947).
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activities. Also, although "independence" is an important attribute
of a "liberal" profession, it is not absolute. For example, doctors employed by clinics or hospitals practice a "liberal" profession even
though they are subordinated to their employers. The characterization of a "liberal" profession as "disinterested" explains certain
rules applicable to the legal profession such as the "honorarium"
concept of legal fees and the traditional ethical rules forbidding lawyers to press their claims against clients for unpaid fees. Savatier
asserts however that a profession which allows one to earn a living
cannot truly be considered "disinterested." According to Savatier
"disinterested" more accurately suggests that a professional must
consider the client's interest before his own. Thus, a merchant
could refuse credit to an insolvent customer but a doctor could not
ethically refuse to treat an insolvent patient.
Second, to Savatier, the nature of the client's interest is the
most characteristic feature of the "liberal" profession. Savatier considers the client's interests "sacred" because they are so closely related to the client as a human being. They affect the stability, honor
and life of the client. The client looks to the lawyer for what Savatier calls "secourshumain" (human help). More than pecuniary and
material
interest, the client delivers to his lawyer a "part of him47
self."

Third, to Savatier, the professional fulfills a social mission by
protecting his clients. However, the professional also owes a duty to
society at large. Professionalism consists in striking a balance between these two social missions. For this the professional needs independence. He needs independence in order to protect his client's
interests; he also needs independence to organize. It is through the
ethical rules formulated and imposed by professional organizations
that the professional will temper the ardor he feels for his client's
interest with a thorough regard for the interests of society at large.48
Another proponent of the traditional approach to the "liberal"
profession, Bdtonnier Damien, defines the profession as one which
recognizes
material and intellectual independence, a liking for a job
well done, a certain disinterest which does not exclude
greed or thrift, a certain benevolent fraternalism toward the
underdog, public favor considering it one of the ornaments
of society, high sense of duty, absolute legal non-accountability, and finally autonomy thanks to its powerful connections, for it is in the last trait that resides the secret of 4this
9
social category: it belongs to the class who holds power.
Thus, under the traditional approach, avocats perceive themselves
as the protectors of the ideals of independence.
47. Id. at 40.
48. Id. at 34-46.
49. Communication of BEtonnier Damien to the Institut de France, Gazette du
Palau 1977, doctrine, at 69.
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Although the principle of independence had always been understood by lawyers, it had never been expressed in any legislative document or regulation prior to its codification into law in 1971. The
silence of the law on the matter of independence is best explained
by the belief that "[i]t is not necessary to express something which
is obvious."5 0
The breadth of professional independence can be best delineated by reviewing the ethical rules governing avocat conduct set
forth in the various texts regulating the legal profession. The avocat
must be independent vis-A-vis his client. This means, among other
things, that honorariums (fees) must not be tied to the client's pecuniary interest in litigation. All contingent fees are prohibited.5 1
This prohibition is imperative, any agreement to the contrary will be
considered null and void,5 2 and the avocat drawing this form of remuneration will incur severe disciplinary sanctions. 53 Independence
also dictates that the avocat be free to accept or refuse representation of the client, free to conduct his argumentation and free to defend the 5client's
interest according to his and not the client's
4
judgment.
It is in the concept of "incompatibilities" that the principle of independence is made explicit by the law. Incompatibilities are situations which subject the avocat to a "bond of servitude," but also
those situations "which, although they do not degrade the character
of an individual or give occasion to any depreciation of his abilities,
nevertheless restrict his will, give others the right to prevail upon
his time, and subject him to personal obligations or duties of a
subordinate to which he is required to accommodate himself under
55
pain of reprimand or the loss of a more or less lucrative position.1
Incompatibilities also involve situations in which the avocat's activities are simply motivated by pecuniary gain. Thus, with a few rare
exceptions such as teaching or serving as substitute judges,5 6 the
profession of avocat is incompatible with any emploi a gages5 7 (employment for a salary) or louage de service5 8 (hiring for services)
because of the legal subordination inherent in such a relationship.
However, while the texts are unanimous in the belief that the legal
50. Blanc, supra n. 32 at 55.
51. See Law No. 71-1130, supra n. 7, art. 10, 70. The same prohibition applies to
conseils juridiques.

52. See Brunois, Note, Cour de Cassation, 4 July 1972, Dalloz, 1973 at 251.
53. Lemaire, supra n. 22 at No. 471.
54. Law No. 71-1130, supra n. 7, art. 7; Decree No. 72-468, supra n. 6, art. 57-69.
55. Douai, 31 July 1843, S. 43, 2.460, cited in Lemaire, supra n. 22 at No. 137.

56. The other exceptions are: associate judges of Tribunals for juvenile delinquents, and members of Social Security Commissions and Agricultural Credit Unions. See Decree No. 72-468, supra n. 7, art. 62.
57. R4glement IntMrieur du Barreau de Paris, art. 37. The term "gage" is generally used to designate a salary received by a domestic employee. But in the language
of the bar, it simply means "salary," regardless of the type of employment. See Lemaire, supra n. 22 at No. 139.
58. Decree No. 72-468, supra n. 6, art. 62.
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profession is incompatible with legal subordination, ther6*is a divergence of opinion as to whether wage-earning by an avocat working
for another necessarily implies legal subordination.
It is beyond dispute that an avocat's employment by a non-avocat will result in that avocat's disbarment. An avocat cannot work
as a permanent collaborateur of an avout, a notaire or a conseil
juridique. Also, lawyers cannot be registered with the Bar if they
work "in house" for private or public employers. Only permanent
collaboration with another avocat is permissible.
The question remains however whether an avocat employed by
another avocat can be a wage-earner. As previously discussed,5 9 the
law organizing the legal profession is vague on this point. For example, the law uses the term "remuneration" rather than "salary" and
"the person to whom he is bound" rather than "the employer. '60
Traditionalists insist that the receipt of a salary from any source,
even from another avocat, entails legal subordination and is thus incompatible with the profession. Although it has been argued that
collaboration is an employment contract in view of the superior's liability for the collaborateur'sactivities, traditionalists maintain that
this liability does not stem from a relationship of respondeat superior, but is simply a function of the non-delegability of the duty
owed the client by the avocat. They characterize the contract between the avocat and his collaborateur as a contrat d'entreprise
(work contract) in which the collaborateur retains his independence. 61 Nevertheless, confess the proponents of this concept, to
classify the contract of collaborationas a work contract sheds only
the palest glimmer of light on the problem, considering the multitude of uncertainties which continually assail such a concept. 62
They admit that "the legal nature of such a contract is not easy to
grasp.

'63

Despite this difficulty, traditionalists are convinced that

considering collaboration as salaried employment would be irresponsible in light of the law.64
Of course, there are certain external similarities between collaboration and employment. In both situations, the worker is assigned
a particular place to work. The worker must conform to a time
schedule set by his superior. There are no salaried employees below the collaborateur. Finally, the superior supplies the worker
those things necessary for his work. These elements are adopted by
the Cour de Cassation and other French courts to find an employeremployee relationship. 65 Despite these similarities, the traditionalists remain firm in their insistence that collaboration is not an em59.
60.
61.
62.

See text accompanying n. 29-44 supra.
Law No. 71-1130, supra n. 7, art. 8, and Decree No. 72-468, supra n. 6, art. 74-76.
Jestaz, Revue Trimestrielle de droit civil 657 (1975).
Id.

63. Id.
64. See Procureur G4n ral Picca's conclusions, Cour d'appel de Paris, 23 Feb.

1977, Dalloz 1977 at 193.
65. Camerlynck, 1 Traitd du droit du travail No. 37-45.
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ployer-employee relationship, since such a view would render the
relationship a "legal incompatibility. '66 They conclude that collaboration is a contrat innomm6 (contract without a name),
a category
67
by itself, unlike any contract known to French law.
The FunctionalApproach
Other segments of the French legal community, especially "doctrine" (law professors and academicians), are critical of the traditionalist view. According to the Functionalists, it is unrealistic to
deny the existence of an employment contract when the legal relationship between the avocat and the collaborateur exhibits all the
characteristics of employment. 68 They insist there is no textual basis for characterization of the contract of collaboration as unique.
Such characterization would place the collaborateurin an uncertain
status and deny him the social
and financial advantages associated
69
with the status of employee.
The Functionalists argue that the avocat's independence is not
compromised by the classification of a collaborateur as an employee. Merely calling the relationship one of employment does not
sacrifice the avocat's independence, since the crucial question is
that of legal subordination. If legal subordination exists in any relationship, be it partnership, association or whatever, incompatibility
is present. Incompatibility occurs only if employment actually impairs the collaborateur'sindependence. For example, if a patron refused a collaborateur his own clients there would be an
incompatibility. Also, if a collaborateur were threatened with dismissal for refusing to accept a case offensive to his conscience, there
would be an incompatibility. A collaborateur would then be forced
to choose between withdrawal from the relationship with his patron
70
or disbarment.
Functionalists cite the realities of other liberal professions to
support their view. Architects are authorized to practice their profession as employees of other architects, as members of firms or as
employees of municipal governments. 7 1 Doctors remain members of
the Medical Association and retain their professional freedom even
though they are employed and paid by hospitals, are unable to set
66. Picca, supra n. 64 at 196.
67. Blanc, supra n. 32 at 58.
68. Chaput, Note, Tribunal d'instance de Paris, 5 April 1977, Semaine juridique

18676.

69. If collaborateurs are employees, the patron is required by law to pay their
professional tax, social security contributions and other benefits such as vacation,

right to notice and so on. Their relationship is governed by labor law which is geared
to the protection of the worker. The law cannot be displaced by private agreement
providing fewer benefits than those provided by law. See n. 4 supra.
70. Chaput, supra n. 68 at 18677.
71. Law No. 77-2, 3 Jan. 1977 (D. 1977.71), art. 14; cited in Jestaz, Note, Cour
d'appel de Paris, 23 Feb. 1977, Dalloz, 1977, at 198.
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their own fees and are unable to choose their own patients.
The Functionalists argue that there is a distinction between "external" and "internal" independence and that the traditional incompatibility between the legal profession and the notion of "hiring for
services" is based only on the fear that the avocat may be subjected
to the will of an "outsider." An avocat cannot be a salari6 vis-A-vis
his client or any other "outsider." However if the employer is
another avocat, the independence of the avocat collaborateuris assured since the law requires the strict absence of any legal subordination in such a relationship. Moreover, there is no express legal
prohibition against the avocat collaborateur'scharacterization as a
salarie. The debates on the Law of 31 December 1971 emphasize the
legislature's deliberate silence on the matter. Thus the Functionalists conclude that even though an avocat collaborateurmay be considered an employee of another avocat, there is no
73 reason why this
characterization should impair his independence.
The Functionalists insist that the debate as to the status of the
collaborateurmust leave the realm of metaphysics and face contemporary realities. In recent years, legal practice has grown in both
size and complexity. The practice of law in contemporary Europe
requires large, sophisticated firms capable of dealing with the increasing diversification of the law. The efficiency required to render
legal service dictates more structural organization within law

firms. 74 To the Functionalists, the subordination inherent in the em-

ployment status must be viewed as a positive organizational tool
rather than a threat to the traditional concept of avocat independence. Currently, such "subordination" is no more than the "integration of a professional into the structure of a service or of an
enterprise. ' 75 To the Functionalists, "legal subordination" should
be
76
more appropriately termed "administrative subordination."
Independence and employment do not exclude one another. For
example, the Functionalists point to corporate executives who, although they are employees of the corporation, still retain the almost
total independence necessary for making the decisions essential to
the organization's existence. The Functionalist's approach is an attempt to reconcile the traditional ethical requirements of avocat independence with the organizational necessities of the new
profession of avocat.
The Avocat View
The avocats themselves are divided on the question of charac72. Soc. 23 Jan. 1974, Bull, civ. V, No. 60, p. 55; 5 June 1975, id., V, No. 312, p. 272;
Dalloz 1975, I.R., at 168, cited in Note, supra n. 71.
73. Note, id.
74. Chirez, "La Qualit6 de Non Salari6 de L'Avocat Collaborateur," 5 Droit Social,
n. 65 at 145 (1978).
75. Camerlynck, supra n. 65 at No. 37-43, cited in Chirez, supra n. 74 at 146.
76. Chirez, id.
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terizing the relation between the collaborateuravocat and his patron. The division of opinion exists in both the membership of the
National Association of Avocats as well as the membership of the
National Association of Young Avocats.77
The split of opinion among senior avocats is largely pragmatic.
Those who favor the classification of salariL for their collaborateurs
do so largely on account of the organizational benefits inherent in
such a relationship. The benefits include a more integrated office,
greater collaborateur loyalty to the firm and total devotion of the
collaborateur'stime to the firm's affairs. Other avocats, especially
the vast majority having smaller practices, find the organizational
benefits minimal compared to the social and financial burdens 78
resulting from the characterization of collaborateursas employees.
Although these social and financial burdens may be warranted
as adequate compensation for the services of a full-fledged lawyer in
permanent collaboration, they appear exorbitant for the minimal
services rendered by the avocat stagiaire. Even those advocating
the status of salarit for collaborateurs are aware of this problem.
Many express the concern that few young lawyers will be able to
find patrons willing to train them if they must be extended the benefits of a salarid as provided by law. A compromise has been suggested, providing that the collaboration of the avocat stagiaire be
subject
to the less demanding laws regulating apprentices of arti79
sans.
The young avocats in favor of the salari6 status for collaborateursare understandably attracted to the social and financial
benefits of such a classification. Despite the obvious benefits, the
majority of young avocats oppose the salari6 classification. 80 A recent congress of the Association Nationale des Avocats de France et
de la CommunautL explored the "Challenge of the Liberal Profession." One of the speakers, although admitting the material benefits
of salari6 to collaborateurs,urged his colleagues to "beware of the
consequences of salariat." Salariat,he said, would deprive the collaborateur'srights to private clientele, the right to be free economically and intellectually. He urged the avocats to fight for a legal
status incorporating all the fiscal and social benefits of salariatwithout being one. Hearty applause accentuated his remarks that avocats should resist the "employee mentality" and that sacrificing
one's independence for immediate social and monetary benefits was
to "besmirch the face of the (legal) profession." 81
77. See Chambonnaud, "La controverse collaboration-salariat" in Le D,fi de la
Profession Liberale, Association nationale des Avocats, 203 (1974). The National Association of Avocats and the National Association of Young Avocats are private organizations.
78. See n. 69 supra.
79. Chaput, see n. 68 supra at 18677, and Jestaz, n. 71 supra at 199.
80. Chambonnaud, supra n. 77 at 196.
81. Id. at 210-15.
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THE DEBATE BEFORE THE COURTS

Although the French courts retain the ultimate power of review
over the administrative proceedings of the French Bar,8 2 until Mine
X brought her case before the Tribunal de la Seine, the Courts had
not entered the debate over the status of the collaborateur. This
was due largely to the fact that disputes between collaborateursand
their patrons were rarely pursued beyond a hearing before the
Batonnier, since avocats as a profession are generally reluctant to
air their "dirty linen" in public. Mine X, however, was not satisfied
with the Bdtonnier's recommendations and took her case to the Tribunal de la Seine. Applying the procedures of labor law, the Tribunal ordered the parties to appear for a conciliation. The defendant
Association of Avocats failed to answer the summons and the Tribunal declared the conciliation unsuccessful. The Tribunal then ordered the parties to appear on 5 July 1976. During the personal
appearance, the defendant refused to respond, alleging that the
Bdtonnier of the Paris Bar had ordered it not to argue the merits of
the case. The defendant argued that sitting as a labor court, the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction since the law dictated an inviolable incompatibility between the legal profession and a "hiring for services"
contract.
On 9 July 1976, the Tribunal entered a judgment ordering an investigation into the facts surrounding Mine X's collaboration with
the defendant. The Tribunal did not rule on the merits of the defendant's jurisdictional argument. The defendant appealed and was
joined by the Batonnier representing the Paris Conseil de l'Ordre.83
Before the Paris Court of Appeals the appellants argued that by
ordering an investigation into the facts of Mine X's case, the Tribunal de la Seine had implicitly conceded the possibility of the existence of a labor contract and that such a concession prejudiced the
appellants' case. Further, the appellants reiterated the argument
that the entire matter of Mine X's collaboration was outside the jurisdiction of the labor courts due to the incompatibility between the
status of avocat and the status of salarie.
In rejecting the appellants' arguments, the Paris Court of Appeals declared that in ordering an investigation into the nature of
the legal relationship between the plaintiff and her employer, the
lower court had not prejudiced the case. The Court further declared
that the determination of the jurisdiction of the lower court is predicated upon the nature of the contract between the parties; absent a
written contract required by law, the lower court was justified in
82. Law No. 71-1130, supra n. 7, art. 24; Decree No. 72-468, supra n. 6, arts. 99-103,
119-126. The avocat and/or the prosecutor appeal the decisions of the Conseil de
l'Ordre before the Cours d'appel.
83. The Conseil de l'Ordre has the authority to enter any dispute affecting the
practice of the profession, particularly where "the rights or prerogatives given to avocats by laws, decrees or regulations have been ignored or questioned." See Crermieu,

Note Dalloz, 1955.417; and Law No. 71-1130, supra n. 7, art. 21.
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looking to the facts of the case to determine whether there was an
employer-employee relationship cognizable by labor law. The Court
of Appeals thus found the lower court had not improperly attempted
to determine
the jurisdictional question. The appeal was dis84
missed.
Following the decision, the investigation ordered by the Tribunal de la Seine continued. After the completion of its investigation,
the Tribunal handed down its decision on 8 April 1977.85 The court
began by noting that there was no written contract between Mine X
and the firm of Avocats as required by law. In the absence of a written contract, the Tribunal was required to look into Mine X's particular employment situation to determine the nature of the
relationship between the parties. The Tribunal found the following
facts crucial: (1) Mme X was employed full-time according to a
schedule determined by her patron. (2) She was not the master of
her arguments. Those cases she argued in court were prepared by
other avocats of the firm. With few exceptions Mine X could not
meet the clients. (3) Mine X engaged in no intellectual work, handling only material, trivial chores "similar to those handled by the
clerical staff." She took oral or written orders from her superiors.
(4) Mine X's compensation was fixed and unrelated to the actual
work done. The Tribunal remarked however that salariat and avocat independence are not incompatible, as evidenced by the practices of the medical profession. (5) Mine X worked in a salle
commune (common room). Although it was not forbidden for Mine
X to receive her private clients, she had to receive her clients in the
salle commune "in the midst of voices, the sounds of telephones,
tape recorders, dictaphones and general hustle and bustle ... ."C6
Only rarely, if the client was "important," could Mine X use a partner's or permanent collaborateur'soffice. The Tribunal considered
this lack of privacy for Mine X and her clients an impairment of her
right to client confidentiality regardless of the client's financial importance.
The Tribunal found that Mme X
was integrated into the structure of service in which her
work was effectively directed and controlled by oral and
written orders for which she was responsible; thus there existed between her and the association of avocats employing
her a bond of subordination rendering her dependent upon
her patron; [and] that this dependence was a serious impairment of 87the freedom that an avocat collaborateur
should enjoy.
The Tribunal also found that fixed compensation constituted a salary, indicative of subordination. The Tribunal believed that al84.
85.
86.
87.

Cour d'appel de Paris, 23 Feb. 1977, Dalloz 1977, at 193.
Tribunal d'instance de Paris, 8 April 1977, Dalloz 1977. I. 589.
Id. at 590.
Id.
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though the salariat is compatible with independence, Mme X's
situation went beyond a mere salariatto legal subordination. The
Tribunal found in Mme X's situation an association of six patrons
with twelve collaborateurswhich destroyed the equality that should
exist among avocats. The Tribunal concluded that Mme X's association "was in fact an enterprise including employers and employees;
[resulting in the modification] of the nature of the contract between
which are
Mme X and her patrons, requiring direction and control
'88
the characteristics of subordination and dependence.
Based on its findings as to the nature of Mme X's employment,
the Tribunal de La Seine found it had jurisdiction to act as a labor
court and rule on the merits of her complaint alleging improper termination of her employment. The Tribunal dismissed the intervention of the Conseil de l'Ordre and, under the applicable provisions of
labor law, ordered the defendants to pay Mme X F.2500 as one
month's wages for notice, F.250 for accrued vacation time and
F.10,000 as punitive damages for abusive termination of her employment contract.
Regrettably, the Tribunal de la Seine's decision provides at best
a confused answer to the question of whether salariat,by its very
nature, engenders subordination incompatible with avocat independence. The Tribunal began by intimating that salariat and avocat
independence were compatible. The Tribunal went on however to
state that the receipt of fixed compensation was indicative of subordination. Although the Tribunal entertained the concept of "administrative subordination" in stating that integration into a structure
necessarily implied direction and control, it left unanswered the
question whether "administrative subordination" runs counter to
avocat independence. Although the Tribunal apparently answered
this question in the affirmative by noting that "an association of six
patrons facing twelve collaborateurs would render non-existent the
equality which should, in theory, reign (among the avocats) of this
firm[,] '"89 the questions remain whether a collaborateur should be
disbarred for agreeing to be integrated into such a structure and
whether sanctions should be imposed upon the patron for providing
such a structure.
THE LEGISLATURE'S INVOLVEMENT

The defendants and the Bdtonnier of the Paris Bar appealed the
judgment of the Tribunal de la Seine to the Court of Appeals of
Paris. While the appeal was pending, an attempt was made in the
French Parliament to influence the outcome of the appeal. This attempt took the form of a rider attached to a projet de loi (bill) introduced by the government to modify the requirements set in Law No.
71-1130 for obtaining the degree of a licence en droit and for admis88. Id.
89. Id.
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sion to the legal profession. 90 The government had tried unsuccessfully to effect the reform by d4cret (executive order).91 A new
school year was almost at hand and the government was eager to
have the legislature validate its proposal. 92 Since the projet de loi
had a very limited objective, 93 it was curious that a member of the
Assemblte Nationale, a former Batonnier of the Bar of Chartres,
would seize the occasion to introduce an additional article to the
government's projet de loi which was totally beyond the bill's objective. The new provision, art. 3, provided that "the avocat who practices his profession as an avocat collaborateur, as a member of a
legal corporation or partnership, cannot be an employee. The present '' disposition,
which is interpretive, has the effect of ordre public. 9 4 The amendment was so remote from the objective of the
original projet de loi that the Commission des Lois of the National
Assembly rejected it outright. In explaining the rejection of the
amendment however, the President of the Commission made the
mistake of commenting upon its merits. In expressing his opinion
that it was wrong to deny the collaborateurthe status of employee
since the collaborateuroften lives in difficult conditions and needs
at least a minimum "social cover," 95 the President of the Commission unleashed a renewal of the perennial debate.
The Minister of Justice endorsed the Commission's rejection of
the amendment and urged the National Assembly to do the same.
The Minister pointed out that since Law No. 71-1130, organizing the
new profession of avocat, contemplated the ultimate consolidation
of the professions of conseiljuridique and avocat, and since the conseil juridique can retain other conseils juridiques as employees, to
refuse avocats the status of employee would be tantamount to a termination of the ongoing merger negotiation between the two professions. A member of the National Assembly questioned the Minister
as to whether he was advocating a union of conseil juridique and
96
avocat which would result in the demise of avocat independence.
The author of the amendment confronted his colleagues with
this logic: either the legal profession is "liberal" and "independent"
with the result that no lawyer can practice his profession as an employee, or collaborateursare employees and are subject to legal subordination. The first alternative is the "obvious" choice and
emphasizes the need for the amendment. The second alternative is
clearly against the law. 97 Ultimately, since the government did not
90. See n. 18 supra.
91. The dcret was challenged on the ground that, being issued by the Executive,
it cannot modify a law.
92. The proposed new Licence en droit requires three years of study instead of
four. Admission to the legal profession requires an additional year and a mattrise

(master degree).
93. J.O., Assemblde National, 23 June 1977 at 4105.
94. Id. at 4107.
95. Id. at 4104.
96. Id. at 4107-08.
97. Id. at 4109.
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wish to jeopardize the chances of quick approval of the bill by risking what would have been a protracted debate on avocat independence, the amendment was quickly approved by the National
Assembly.
When the projet de loi went to the Senat for consideration, the
government made a final attempt to have the amendment dropped
from the bill, arguing that the status of the collaborateur"is a great
problem which would require a great debate, . .. which does not
find its -place in the framework of a projet de loi with a very limited
and specific purpose." 98 The Senat Commission des Lois, however,
did not agree with the government. The Commission's rapporteur
appealed to the Senat's respect for the "sacrosanct power of the
Parliament," which had solemnly expounded in Law No. 71-1130 that
the legal profession is "liberal" and "independent." The rapporteur
again reminded the members of the Senat that avocat independence and salariatwere incompatible. 99
Evidently few members of the Senat were inclined to challenge
the "sacrosanct power" of Parliament. The amendment was quickly
approved by the Senat on 29 June 1977 and promulgated by the government on 30 June 1977.100
There is an obvious explanation for the haste with which the
amendment made its way through the legislature. The Conseil de
l'Ordre of the Paris Bar sought such legislation to guide the hand of
the Paris Court of Appeals in deciding Mine X's case. It is not insignificant that Mr. Gerbert, the amendment's author, is himself a
former Bdtonnier. The driving force behind the amendment is most
evident in the comments of a Senat member who noted that "the
courts need to be enlightened," and that the purpose of the amendment was to "make it impossible for the courts to misinterpret the
10 1
law."
Art. 3 of the Law of 30 June 1977 on collaboration concludes
with the provision that it is "interpretive" and has the character of
"ordrepublic" (public policy). Because of these two provisions, art.
3's scope is broad.
A law is "interpretive" when "it is limited to identifying, without
changing, an existing right which an imperfect definition would
make susceptible to controversy."' 1 2 Since it theoretically adds
nothing to an already existing law, interpretive laws are retroactive. 0 3 Thus the relationship between avocat and collaborateur as
characterized by art. 3 applied retroactively to all such relationships
98. J.O., Senat, 29 June 1977 at 1920.
99. Id. at 1921-22.
100. Law No. 77-685, 30 June 1977, modifying art. 7,11,12,17 and 54 of Law No. 71-1130
of 31 Dec. 1971 on Reforms of Certain Legal Professions. .0., 1 July 1977 at 3433.
101. J.0., supra n. 98 at 1922.
102. Soc., 19 June 1963, Gaz. Pal. 1963 I. 278.
103. Under art. 2 of the French Civil Code, laws are non-retroactive. However, this
principle applies only to judges and not to legislators. The non-retroactivity principle

can be set aside by (1) a law expressly declared retroactive, (2) a law validating prior
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dating back to the time of the promulgation of the 1971 law on the
profession of avocat. As a result, the new law governs and characterizes the relationship between Mme X and her patron. Under art.
3, Mine X could not have been a salaried employee of her patron.
This finding is strengthened by art. 3, which has the authority of ordre public. Ordre public governs the freedom of contract and private parties. 10 4 French law provides that generally parties are free
to contract as they please. Such agreements "have the force of law
for those who have made them."10 5 However, a contract made for an
illegal purpose is unenforceable. A purpose is illegal when it'is prohibited by law or when it is contrary to ordre public or bonnes
moeurs (good morals). Art. 6 of the French Civil Code provides that
"laws relating to public order or good morals cannot be derogated by
private agreement." Laws such as art. 6 are lois imperatives (imperative laws) which take priority over any parties' agreements to the
is deemed to
contrary. A contract in violation of a loi imperative
10 6
have an illegal purpose and is thus a nullity.
Lois imperatives are unambiguous expressions of the legislature's view of ordre public "indispensable to the maintenance of the
social order."1 07 Lois imperatives are considered the means by
which the nation is protected from the threat of unbridled private
contract. 0 8 That the authors of art. 3 drafted the prohibition of
salariat between avocats as an ordre public provision indicated
their intention to leave the Court of Appeals no choice but to rule
against Mine X. One commentator observed that "the evil of the
salariatclassification for collaboration [must have been deemed by
the legislators] so substantial that they decided to use such radical
remedies."'10 9
THE SECOND DECISION

The classification of art. 3 as interpretive made its applicability
to Mme X's case automatic." 0 Mme X's patron and the Batonnier
of the Paris Bar were thus supplied with a formidable weapon.
They argued that since the prohibition against salariat was ordre
public, Mme X could not claim she was an employee and ask to receive the benefits conferred by such a status. Additionally, the laacts considered null and void or (3) a law expressly qualified as interpretive. See
Carbonnier, Droit civil 131-35 (1974); Marty-Raynaud, Droit civil 184-97 (1972).
104. Ordre public is also used by French judges to ignore a foreign law applicable
under French conflict of laws rules. In this respect, ordre public is comparable to
"public policy" in American law, although its scope is broader. See Batiffol &
Lagarde, Droit InternationalPriv, 444-70 (1974).
105. French Civil Code, art. 1134.
106. Id., arts. 1131, 1133.
107, Marty-Raynaud, supra n. 103 at 175.
108. Carbonnier, supra n. 103 at 108.
109. Chirez, supra n. 74 at 149.
110. See n. 103 supra.
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bor court could not have jurisdiction over the present dispute
between avocats.
In its decision of 7 November 1977, the Paris Court of Appeals
refused to defer to the legislature's will."1 The court first addressed
the legal profession's incompatibility with the "hiring for services"
contract as delineated by the Decree of 9 June 1972.112 The court
found this incompatibility to be only an "external incompatibility."
As such, the law prohibited only employment relationships between
avocats and non-lawyers, since such relationships could impair the
"liberal" and "independent" character of the avocat. When the relationship is between avocats exclusively however, the court held that
courts must look to the true nature of the specific relationship involved. Absent a written contract, as in Mine X's case, the courts
must look to the circumstances surrounding the relationship to determine its true nature. After examining the circumstances, the
court concluded that "all the usual characteristics of legal subordination were present."" 3 Significantly, the court noted that an employment contract is not per se incompatible with the "independence required in 4an avocat's rendering assistance to and representing his clients.""
The court's finding was rather curious. First the court took into
account the circumstances behind the bill's quick movement
through the legislature. The court emphasized particularly the fact
that the bill was introduced while the court was still deliberating
upon Mine X's case, despite the opposition of both the Commission
des Lois and the Minister of Justice. Second, the court ruled that
the law applied only to: (1) members of legal corporations, (2)
members of partnerships or (3) collaborateurs. Outside these categories, said the court, the status of employee is not ruled out. In the
present case, absent a written agreement, such a status was found
to exist through the conditions surrounding Mine X's employment:
Mine X was assigned fragmentary and trivial work, she was confined
to a common office, had no real independence, was deprived of any
significant initiative, and could only take explicit orders. In short,
the court found Mme X's status that of veritable subjection. The
court further declared that since Mme X's employers had failed to
provide her with a written contract as provided by law, they had
failed to abide by the law and hence infringed upon her independence. 11 As a result, the court affirmed the6 lower court's award of
both compensatory and punitive damages."
111. Cour d'appel de Paris, 7 November 1977, Dalloz, 1977 at 652.
112. See n. 58 supra.
113. Cour d'appel de Paris, supra n. 111 at 655.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 656.
116. At the time of writing, the case of Mine X was being appealed to the Cour de
Cassation.
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The Unresolved Issues

Although the commentators did not object to Mine X's vindication in the Court of Appeals, they criticized the court's handling of
the concepts at issue in the case. 117 For the court to carve out of art.
3 an exception for collaborationbetween avocats, to 'declare that no
collaboration existed between Mine X and the other avocats, is unjustified by any possible meaning attributable to the law. The commentators criticize the court for gutting the law of its substance" 8
by "sullenly" refusing to apply the law as written. They wrote that
the court should have stated in which circumstances the inevitable
dominance of the patron results in the legal subordination of the
collaborateur,rendering the relationship between them both illegal
and unethical. Rather than draw the line between legally and ethically approved collaboration and unallowable legal subordination,
the court merely blurred further an already undefined distinction." 9
As a result, the "mini-revolution" begun by Mme X's case did
little to clarify the legal status of the collaborateur. Although the
controversy did result in the enactment of art. 3 and its provision
that, as a matter of public policy, the collaborateur cannot be employed in "legal servitude," the exact nature of "legal servitude" is
hopelessly unclear. Thus the conflict between avocat independence
and the organizational realities of modem collaboration in French
law practices remains unresolved.
THE AMERICAN MODEL

In the United States no one disputes the view that associates

are employees. The term "associates," when used by the American
Bar Association, designates "attorneys who are employed by an-

other attorney or law firm and do not share responsibility or liability
for the acts of the firm."'120 Additionally, the National Labor RelaNational Labor Relations Act to
tions Board has interpreted the
121
treat associates as employees.
In America as in France, however, the model of the lawyer as an

independent professional is still nurtured. The American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility speaks of the "independent professional judgment" of the lawyer on behalf of the

client. 122 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. considers "analysis of the legal and
practical dimensions of the clients' position, evaluation of the risks
117. See Jestaz, Dalloz, 1977 at 652 and Chirez, supra n. 74 at 150.
118. Jestaz, id.
119. Id.
120. A.B.A. Commission on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 310 (1967).

121. However, few associates seem anxious to unionize. They are afraid that
unionization may jeopardize their chance for promotion in the firm. Pressures of conformity are such that even among associates there is a perception that those who
seek unionization are "either mediocrities in need of such group support, or masochists." See Sloane &Witney, Labor Relations 14 (1977) cited in Note, "Unionization of
Law Firms," 46 FordhamL.Rev. 1008 at 1029 (1978).
122. A.BA Canons of Professional Ethics, No. 5.
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and potential gains involved in pursuing alternative courses of action... and recommendation of what the lawyer believes to be the
optimal course of action for the client"'123 the hallmarks of the legal
profession. The French notion of avocat independence is echoed in
"extenWilliam Kornhauser's view of the American professional's
1 24
sive autonomy in exercising a special competence."'
Despite the theoretical similarity between French and American
notions of professionalism, autonomy is perhaps the least visible attribute of associates in American law firms. Unlike their French
counterparts, associates are not allowed to have their own exclusive
clientele. 125 If associates do have personal clients, they may be forbidden from receiving them at the firm's offices. If individual associates' clients are brought to the firm, they may be considered the
firm's clients rather than the associate's. Generally, inexperienced
associates are assigned particular aspects of a client's work. Often
the associate is unaware of the client and equally uninformed about
the broader aspects of the particular problem upon which he is
working.
Although the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
"a lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of
the law,"'1 26 many associates in reality work for their supervising
partner rather than the client. Even where he has contact with the
client, the associate can rarely act according to his own beliefs as to
the client's best interests. When associates of a large Wall Street
firm were asked whom they try to please, their supervising partner
or the client, the common answer was that primary responsibility
was to the partner rather than the client. 127 One associate confessed: "I have had to do things I thought were not right for the client, but the client is not the individual lawyer's but the firm's client.
When the firm fixes policy, that has to be my own policy.' 28 An29
other associate felt that associates inevitably become "yes-men."
It has been suggested that associates are traditionally expected
to debate questions of law with their superiors. 30 A partner in a
large firm expressed the opinion that if there were cause for a debate upon a legal matter, he "would feel horrified if [the associate]
did not raise hell.' 3 1 But associates are well advised to take such
123. Hazard, Ethics in the Practiceof Law 77 (1978).
124. Kornhauser, Scientists in Industry: Conflicts and Accomodation 11 (1962)
cited in Smigel, The Wall Street Lawyer 265 (1973).
125. A Cleveland firm, perhaps the last bastion of associate autonomy, allowing as-

sociates to operate their own private practice while maintaining their affiliation with
the firm, finally had to give up this system because "it just became too difficult to
manage." The NationalLaw Journal,28 January 1980.
126. A.BA. Canons of Professional Ethics, No. 5.
127. Smigel, supra n. 123 at 299.
128. Id. at 298.
129. Id.
130. Smigel (n. 123 supra) noted that this is the main difference between law firms
and other bureaucratic organizations.
131. Smigel, id. at 322.
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statements with a grain of salt. The associate must know when to
desist in any debate with superiors. Although his failure to argue a
point of law may detrimentally affect an associate's opportunity for
promotion, not to know when to stop is fatal. An associate does not
often take the disagreement to the firm's client. Since, as a practical
matter, associates work for their firm and not the client, going past a
superior to the client might be tantamount to professional suicide.
French law protects the collaborateur'sright to turn down assignments he considers against his conscience, but in American law an
associate's right to refuse an assignment is "unusual."1 32 If the
Code of Professional Responsibility states "comprehensively the
rules by which lawyers should perform their calling, '13 3 the code apparently does not apply to associates. Since the organizational realities of American law firms dictate that associates obey orders,
associates must forego autonomy. As the firm grows larger, the
greater is the need for integration and the broader the gap between
ethical dictates and organizational realities.
The American Bar allows for the sacrifice of associate autonomy
by distinguishing between "internal" as opposed to "external" controls of associates. Essentially, although control of lawyers by
sources external to the firm is impermissible, control from within
the organization is not merely "proper" but "salutary.' 13 4 This distinction between internal and external controls however is perhaps
little more than an ex postfacto rationalization of organizational realities, since both controls prevent the lawyer from "performing his
calling" and exercising his "independent professional judgment."
Curiously, although individual lawyers and associates feel the
strain of the dilemma, 135 the American legal community has failed
to address itself to the conflict between the ethical dictates and the
organizational realities of the profession. This indifference is perhaps part of an ideological shift in American society. The autonomy
and non-conformity inherent in the Protestant Ethic may have been
displaced by a growing belief in the value of teamwork. Teams must
be organized to be effective. In a law firm, organization means taking orders and respecting organizational rules.
CONCLUSION

The American organizational model has had an impact on
French society. 136 With the growth and prosperity of France in the
"hour of Europe," the French legal community is acutely aware of
the need for reconsideration of the value of organizations. But
132. Id. at 331.
133. Hazard, supra 122 at 19.
134. Commission on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 334 (1967).
135. See Smigel, supra n. 123 at 205-340.
136. See, for example, Servan-Schreiber, Le D4fi Americain (The American Chal-

lenge, translated from French by Ronald Steel). This French best-seller extols the
virtues of the American organizational model.
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many avocats are unwilling to renounce professional independence
and accept the American model. The tension between the past and
the present, the struggle between professional independence and organizational dictates, and the search for a way to reconcile these
contradictory forces have all contributed to the as yet unresolved
"mini-revolution" concerning the status of the collaborateur.

